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I 
 
Schelling used the word ‘construction’ to indicate an account 
that located a phenomenon within the whole, and thus explained it 
from the whole. 'This paper considers the place of nature within 
Fichte's original system — as expounded in the 1794 Foundations of 
the Whole Theory of Science and the 1795 Outline of the Distinctive 
Character of the Theory of Science — and raises the question of the 
explanatory function of nature within transcendental idealism. Nature 
is deduced, or ‘constructed’ in Schelling's term, in section four of the 
Foundations, the theoretical part of the Theory of Science. That 
deduction furnishes us the concept of nature as necessary and 
independent of us, but shows how it is permeated by lawfulness, which 
is the work of mind.1 Nature is the object correlated with intelligence, 
the I as dependent on (quantitatively determined by) the not-I.  
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This discussion is not concerned with the problematic grounding 
of first principles in the Foundations. Whether the third fundamental 
principle is reached deductively by a priori reasoning or is an 
explanatory hypothesis abstracted from the analysis of empirical 
consciousness is of little importance to it, though this writer views 
philosophical theories as heuristic structures whose standard is 
coherence, not as foundationalist enterprises. The discussion is 
situated intellectually in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, textually in 
the difficult terrain of the Foundations' endlessly unraveling 
arguments. As I understand Fichte's thoughts and second thoughts 
about the matter, section four — the territory of quantitative 
divisibility where I and not-I oppose and limit each other — falls into 
two parts: first, an exhibition of the fluid nature of categorial thought 
that points toward intuition as its real moment (Kant's “thinking 
without intuition is empty”), secondly, the Deduction of 
Representation, which moves from the twofold (reflective and 
productive) interplay of the I's and not-I's activities in intuition toward 
the fixity of thought, as if to illustrate the other side of Kant's saying, 
»intuition without thinking is blind. “In the latter process, the whirl of 
productive and reflective activities is first fixed — The intuitor 
determines itself to the thinking of an object”2 — then understanding is 
submitted to the determination of judgment, and finally to the 
abstractive power of reason. 
 
Fichte viewed the theoretical philosophy of the 
Wissenschaftslehre's first presentation as murky to everyone but 
himself,3 but felt the practical theory of science provided the 
metaphysical foundation for the earlier treatment of cognition. The 
Outline's reworking of theoretical theory of science makes that claim 
clear in starting the construction of nature (or, what is the same, of 
sensation or quality in matter) from the I's double striving to extend 
itself to infinity and to reflect upon itself. If the wavering of 
imagination produces the objectivity or ‘reality’ of sensation (the 
intuition, where intuitor has disappeared into intuited), feeling or self-
affection, produced by the repeated setting and crossing of limits, 
produces the sensor and its synthesizing activity.4 Intuition furnishes 
only presence or a sense of reality derivative from limitation; sensory 
and higher conscious acts are dynamic modifications of the psychic 
forum provided by the interplay of action and limitation (striving, 
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feeling, drive, inclination). It is on the psychic theater of registered 
affections that the changing determinacies of inner and outer intuition 
are displayed. Fichte claims the metaphysics of the Theory of Science 
is found in the practical part. There is no object without a subject; in 
every conscious or merely soulish act, something in or of the I acts on 
something independent of, but for, it.5 
 
We must briefly consider the systematic integrity of the Theory 
of Science and its synthetic-analytic method. It is the tension between 
the absolute positing of the I in the first principle and the synthetic 
positing of the divisible I and the divisible not-I in the third that moves 
the argument and its regressive analysis of that synthesis.6 Since 
argument and analysis never finally resolve the postulated original 
synthesis, never cut the knot but remove it to infinity,7 the logical-
systematic project of showing that the synthesis is grounded in the 
thetic positing of the absolute I is never accomplished, but pushed off 
into the receding infinity of the ought where the reconciliation is 
proclaimed by a philosophic fiat.8 What is the status of the opposite 
factors that appear at each stage of the progressive analysis? They are 
intermediate links, synthetic points which accumulate between the 
ultimate extremes, which are themselves untouched and in need of 
further unification.9 If we understand synthesis as the productive 
activity that oscillates between extremes and in touching upon them, 
brings the neither/nor of their opposition into a both/and of their 
reunion — this wavering is imagination, and its product is intuition, the 
logical substrate of activity-become-world10 — then what its 
progressive dissolution into opposites and sub-synthesis does (first for 
the philosopher, then for the reflecting self) is to generate a series of 
points interposed between the infinitely removed pure I and pure not-
I. Though I and not-I directionally define the line of finite realities 
(states of self and world), they are imperceptible, as infinitely apart as 
they are infinitely opposed. Perceptible points, however, the products 
of analysis and sub-synthesis, accumulate between them, generate a 
thickness, produce as it were a perceptible line: the empirical world of 
finite knowers and agents, and their objective setting. 
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II. 
 
Fichte is anything but clear on the argumentative structure of 
the theoretical section of the Foundations; this is not surprising, given 
the work's hasty writing and episodic publication. That the Deduction 
of Representation is not only the culminating but the crucial stage is 
attested by its repetition and amplification in section five of the 
practical part.11 We shall return to this text in greater detail. The 
Deduction's importance is shown also by the placement of a simplified 
version of it at the head of the Outline's clarification of theoretical 
philosophy, in the section titled Deduction of Intuition.12 The I's 
original activity is there said to be checked and reflected, and 
accounted not as the I's activity but as that of an alien something. A 
second free activity wrenches the first activity and rebound (or ‘affect’) 
free, examines, and reproduces or represents its contents, again not 
as its own activity, but as an image of the not-I.13 This sketch of 
image-formation furnishes the clue for the explanation of sensation 
and of the vanishing of the sensor or subject into the sensed or object 
in the very activity of appropriating the content. The epitome of 
technical difficulty for Fichte's Theory of Science is to explain the 
reality of the sensed in sensation, given its origin in the I's pure 
activity. 
 
If the importance of the Deduction of Representation is clear, 
the function of the preceding one hundred pages of the Foundations is 
very obscure. The general aim of the argument is to establish that, as 
intelligence, the I is determined by the not-I, or that the activity of the 
I establishes the interaction of the I and not-I in such a way that the 
former appears to depend on the latter. Attempts to mediate the 
apparent paradox of the dependence of an all-active I on a not-I, 
whose reality is just a portion of its activity alienated, all fall into a 
circle of contradiction. None of the categories of relation — interaction, 
substantiality, or efficacy — resolve the contradiction.14 The 
unthinkably complex determining and determinable self-relation is 
finally seen to be the work of the imagination, described as a self-
reproducing self-conflict of infinite (determining) and finite 
(determinable) activities. The activity wavers between extremes it 
cannot unite, and so temporizes the I.15 Or, in an alternate 
explanation, in the attempt to think opposites together, mind wavers 
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between the demand for synthesis and the impossibility of 
accomplishing it, commutes between the extremes, and in its 
movement imparts a thickness and opacity to the space between, 
forming intuition or the spatial-temporal manifold.16 Fichte's project 
here was evidently to interpose some basis for empirical reality 
between the divisible I and its counterpart. 
 
But how can what Kant called the sensible manifold be traced to 
the activity of the I? Fichte's intent in the theoretical Theory of Science 
is to rewrite the Critique of Pure Reason, specifically the 
Transcendental Analytic, in order to eliminate any causality by the 
thing-in-itself. Even the sensible manifold, the bare given of sensation, 
must be accounted for from the side of the tion: pure intuition, the 
synthesis of productive imagination, and the unity of apperception.17 
The latter two, functioning together as synthesis, are the 
understanding, the faculty of pure concepts.18 If the understanding's 
work is viewed more as synthetic unification rather than as 
determination by bare quality or quantity, the relational categories of 
substance, efficacy and interaction play the key role in transforming 
disparate sensations into perceptions. Their conceptual content is 
inherence, consequence, and composition, and their temporal 
interpretation is time as duration, succession, and simultaneous 
existence.19 Kant supposed all of this transcendental machinery 
worked upon the empirically given manifold of sensation, imposing 
unity on multiplicity, form upon matter. Fichte does away with the 
multiplicity of the given, and for the bare logical unity of apperception 
substitutes the synthesis expressed in the third basic principle, where 
the limited I is confronted by the limited not-I. He wishes to effect the 
synthesis abstractly and a priori, as thought, and thus attempts to 
think the synthesis by means of the pure concepts of substance, 
efficacy, and community, viz., alteration, continuity of alteration, and 
composition. The synthesis takes place not only at the level of abstract 
thought, but also on the level of imagination. Kant defined imagination 
as “the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not 
present”20 and described its scope as the action of the understanding 
upon sensibility in general. Transposing these hints to the framework 
of genetic explanation, Fichte makes productive imagination ultimately 
productive of intuition itself. Initially abstract cognitive synthesis 
becomes sensuous presence, the empirical manifold into whose 
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sensory manifestation the I and its productive activity disappear. What 
appears between I and not-I, on this side of the boundary between 
them, is a field of activity and reflection that has become an altering, 
continuous, composite something: the stuff of objectivity paradoxically 
derived from the I's pure spontaneity. 
 
III. 
 
The true focus of this inquiry is the process in which nature or 
objectivity emerges for the I, where the not-I is constituted as an 
outside reality. Two crucial texts use metaphors of deficient perception 
to suggest the paradox that pure activity gives rise to reality, not once 
but at two different levels: On the one hand, activity appears in the 
guise of the affect, sensation, or intuition that appears solely as 
intuited; on the other, it imparts shadowy reality to the ground of 
objectivity, the not-I, which exerts a force against the I that is in fact 
imparted to it by the I. The Outline describes the first case, sensation 
as the place where the I loses itself in its object, where activity shows 
itself only as passivity. There its action is intuition, “a silent 
unconscious contemplation that loses itself in its object.”21 In the 
Foundations' Deduction of Representation, it is said the not-I is 
realized and empowered to limit the self's reflection when a “dark, 
unreflected intuition that does not reach determinate consciousness” is 
projected beyond the initial boundary.22 
 
We must furnish some account at this point of the difference 
between activity and reflection. The origin of reflection is not a topic 
for theoretical Theory of Science, whose exclusive concern is the 
constitution of preconscious objectivity. Accordingly, the Outline treats 
the topic simply, borrowing from the practical philosophy of the 
Foundations the view that the I is impelled by a double striving, one a 
tendency to fill infinity, the other to comprehend it or reflect on itself 
as something infinite.23 Its first reflection is necessary, occasioned by 
the limitation or check of its productive activity. It flows, however, 
from the nature of the I: “The I reflects simply because it reflects.”24 
 
The origin of reflection is a larger problem, however, for the 
1794 Foundations, for the initial model of the doubling of productive 
and reflective activities given in the Deduction of Representation freely 
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avails itself of the check or arbitrary determinate limitation. Near the 
end of the deduction of imagination in the constellation of theoretical 
faculties, the check is introduced as a metaphor for the disappearing 
objectivity of the finite factor in the conjunction-and-clash of infinite 
and finite activities.25 The check is pictured as throwing back, or 
reflecting, the I's outward-going activity; the only thing plainly 
asserted of it is that it is not posited by the positing I, while its 
possibility is determined by that activity.26 This is restated more clearly 
in the practical philosophy's deduction of striving (§ 5) where Fichte 
asserts that the condition for the possibility of an alien influence must 
be grounded beforehand in the I. If difference can ever enter the I, it 
must have been there originally, grounded in its activity?? All this is to 
say, I believe, that if the I is ever limited by alien objectivity, this can 
be understood a priori through the J's activity. It is a conceptual 
possibility, though, not a necessity. That it happens, a finite I can 
assure itself in experience.28 This is in apparent violation of the easy 
symmetry between thinking and experience that Fichte asserts in the 
Outline when he claims that whatever theory of science correctly 
deduces will show up in experience, though it would be true were 
there no experience at all.29 
 
With the possibility of reflection established, we can now look to 
those passages where the mystery of the not-I's reality (the “dark 
unreflected intuition”) and of the sensation's objectivity (the “silent 
unconscious intuition”, where the intuitor recedes into what is intuited) 
are given the explanation of which they are capable. The I has a 
general tendency to reflect, but it can never be conscious of itself as 
spontaneity or activity; reflection is always compelled, i. e., it results 
in consciousness of a product, never of an act.30 Consciousness will 
never capture the spontaneous and self-reverting activity of the I, only 
the activity that registers its being affected by some force from 
without. The conscious I is conscious only of some state of itself, or, 
more carefully, of some alteration in its state. A double objectivity is 
interposed between the original activity of the I and the state of 
consciousness called perception, where the I identifies itself with its 
affect and knows itself as dependent on an external something. 
 
We can now look to the Deduction of Representation itself,31 
confessing it would be unintelligible without its repetition in the 
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practical philosophy32 and again in the beginning of the Outline.33 [1] 
Fichte begins the deduction with an account of how the infinite 
outreaching activity of the I becomes a real something, an intuition. 
This intuition is the outcome of imagination: activity wavering between 
extremes it cannot unite. In it activity is formed into product, 
subjectivity transformed into objectivity. The I active in intuition can 
never become conscious of its activity as intuitor. Fichte conveys this 
situation very abstractly by positing (a) the outward-reaching activity, 
(b) its check and deflection back toward the self at some arbitrary 
point, and (c) a conflict or alternation between the two activities, 
outgoing and incoming. The alternation temporizes and gives 
extension to the area between the I and its imagined boundary. This is 
the first circuit of energy or productive activity.34 Since Fichte later 
calls this productive activity centrifugal activity, it is reasonable to 
suppose that he has in mind Kant's dynamic construction of matter in 
the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. The first circuit (acti-
vity-check-reflection) as a whole models Kant's repulsive or resistant 
force, which, though it works outward, is compressed at a point.35 The 
product of Fichte's deduction to this point may be visualized as a 
point-instant. 
 
A second circuit of activity-and-reflection is generated by the 
continuing activity of the I, this time in a reflective, not a productive 
mode. [2] What differentiates the productive from the reflective mode 
is that the first circuit, a mere action-reaction or wavering in the 
imagination, is stabilized and fixed by reason, i.e., permeated with the 
rigidity of logical structures, rendered into a real something. Intuition 
becomes a state of the I, capable of itself being intuited and 
appropriated by the I as its affection.36 [3] This allows the I's activity 
to go forth as active, distinct from this fixed product, and be reflected 
again as its activity. In the second circuit of activity-and-reflection, 
therefore, the intuitor emerges as intuiting its prior product; this is 
sensation. 
 
The second circuit is complicated, however. [3a] There is no 
second check, but the second outward wave of activity, essentially 
reflective since the productive aspect has been precipitated out, must 
be limited in order to intuit the previous product. Its activity is turned 
back again at the limit of its previous activity, i.e., the point of check 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Fichte-Studien, Vol 11 (October 1997): pg. 1-11. DOI. This article is © Philosophy Documentation Center and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Philosophy Documentation Center does not 
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission 
from Philosophy Documentation Center. 
9 
 
and rebound. It is deflected this time because productive activity steps 
beyond the previous limit, and by an unreflected act of imagination 
posits another intuition on the other side of the boundary. This is the 
»dark unreflected intuition« of our search, the felt reality of a limit that 
is not internalized and does not become a something. The not-I or 
nature is constructed, then, as the produced limit that acts (or reacts) 
as a beyond because it is an unintuited (“dark unreflected”) intuition.37 
[3b] The not-I, then, returns the second activity, and the wavering 
product of outgoing and incoming activity on this second level 
produces another intuition, the image or copy. This second cycle of 
activity-and-reflection creates the first as a state of the intuiting I. The 
second or reflective cycle of activity-and-return is later called 
centripetal, on analogy with Kant's second dynamic force, the so-called 
attractive force.38 [4] A third cycle, where productive activity flows 
endlessly outward and is infinitely returned past the boundary and the 
stabilized product, produces an intuition of the intuited; it is 
unreflected, has but a directional and felt reality. This is the thing-in-
itself or noumenon, the not-I in its ultimate capacity of distinguishing 
the sensation felt as mine from the outside felt as beyond.39 
 
In the course of this deduction, then, Fichte has (with some 
difficulty) explained that (A) the I produces the intuition in 
imagination, (B) stabilizes it as a reality in the understanding, (C) 
makes the intuited-something into its state while distinguishing it from 
something else which is not itself, and (D) makes this not-I (which is 
nonetheless its product) the source and origin of its affection or state. 
The whole complex is representation. The key task of distinguishing 
the subject of representation from object represented falls to the 
reality produced by the I, but unreflectedly projected outward as the 
not-I, objectivity as such, or nature. No one, as Fichte rightly says, 
can doubt that she experiences it or something like it on the empirical 
level. It is incapable of further explanation on idealistic assumptions 
than Fichte has given it. His explanation of it is judicious in that, on 
the empirical level, our experience of it is precisely that of a felt limit 
which is not me. The theoretical part of the Theory of Science gives it 
just that minimal an ontological standing, though it must go through 
many explanatory turns to achieve that minimality. 
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IV. 
 
When Fichte again deploys this scheme of the double circuit of 
activity and reflection in the main section of the practical Theory of 
Science, it is much simplified.40 The mysterious role of the check, the 
dark intuition projected over the boundary, the third circuit of 
noumenal influence that teaches the I to distinguish between sensation 
and object, all drop from sight. The I is said, from the first, to be 
productive and reflective, its self-reverting activity falling into 
centripetal and centrifugal activities. This simplification is effected by 
Fichte's borrowing from philosophy of nature notions that are really 
given to it by transcendental philosophy: Assume, he says, that the I 
is a self-constituting mathematical point; its activity will be inner force, 
reflective, centripetal activity. But if that point is posited as an I, as 
self-reflecting, its activity will be infinitely centrifuga1.41 
 
On this simplified model, the centrifugal and centripetal 
impulses of the I's activity, which issue from the demand that the I 
infinitely extend itself and also infinitely reflect, become the bases for 
the real series of presentations and the ideal series of projects. The 
feeling of finitude or restriction occasioned by the check upon activity 
both determines the I as intelligence and differentiates the activities of 
the theoretical and practical faculties. Infinite practical striving (as in 
the ever receding moral ideal) and cognition limited to knowledge of a 
world of finite objects and agents are reciprocal conditions for one 
another, the infinite and finite partial realizations of the I's absolute 
se1f-positing.42 The crucial condition is the realization of the check, the 
dark, unreflected intuition projected beyond as not-I. Only by the 
doubled circuit of activity and reflection is the I in its self-activity made 
open to external influence. Only because its positing takes this highly 
complicated form of outgoing and return (rather than pure self-
reversion) is its identity a state of reciprocity which leaves it open to 
the incursion that will make its action into conscious life.43 
 
Fichte's arguments and explanations often end up more 
complicated than he intends, and it is usually fairly difficult to discern 
the intent behind large stretches of argument. Perhaps history can 
shed light where argument is opaque. It is clear, of course, that Fichte 
wishes to put Kant's transcendental synthesis of the imagination at the 
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center of both the theoretical and practical philosophies of the Theory 
of Science. Its merely formal function in Kant's theory is surpassed; 
what was there merely a function that related the fixed extremes of 
sensibility and understanding becomes in Fichte's hand the dynamic 
agent that evolves those extremes out of its evanescent activity. 
Fichte also uses Kant's model of matter as a synthesis of dynamic 
forces to finitize cognition in the Deduction of Representation and to 
differentiate willing from cognition; Fichte's language is so abstract 
that one tends to forget that his infinite striving nestles in a finite 
body. Fichte is indebted to Spinoza on this score as well, for the grand 
dogmatist located the boundless conatus in the affects, making the 
self-aware component of consciousness derivative from and adjectival 
upon sensation's registration of a change of state in the bodily 
environment. Finally, one ought to acknowledge Fichte's debt to 
Leibniz. The finite I whose cognition is based upon awareness of 
change of state, and whose conscious endeavors all depend on striving 
bears much resemblance to Leibniz's monad, the perception-machine 
driven by appetition, upon whose self-activity is overlaid the 
semblance of external influence. 
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